The suspension of reason in Hegel and Schelling

Countering the common depiction of Hegel and Schelling as uncritical champions of reason's triumph in the modern world, I analyze the significance of their respective claims that reason must be "suspended" ( aufgehoben) in both its theoretical and practical employments. After tracing their uptake of the Kantian distinction between the endless categorizing of the understanding (Verstand) and the self-criticism of reason (Vernunft), I argue that Hegel and Schelling demonstrate the need for a form of cognition beyond reason. In particular, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Schelling's Freedom essay offer alternate spatial models for how reason's infinite striving can be suspended without annulling its advantages over the understanding. These spatial models set the stage for some of the most important debates in twentieth century continental ethics, and careful attention to their structures potentially offers a way around some dialectical impasses concerning the self and the other.